The "Stationarity" of Shadow Prices of Factors in Project Evaluation, with and without Distortions by Bhagwati, Jagdish N. & Wan, Henry
The "Stationarity'' of Shadow Prices
of Factors in Project Evaluation,
with and without Distortions
By JAGDISH N . BHAGWATI AND HENRY WAN, JR.*
Until recently, the literature on cost-bene-
fit analysis for projects has been largely
within the domain of research on "public
monopoly," literature currently reviewed by
Jacques Lesourne, (ch. 3), and the work of
public finance theorists as typified in the
celebrated practical work of Ian Little and
James Mirrlees in their Manual, and in the
recent theoretical contribution of Peter
Diamond and Mirrlees. International trade
theorists have, however, turned now to the
analysis of these problems, starting with the
early work of Vijay Joshi and Deepak Lai,
then that of W. M. Corden, and most recently
culminating in the contributions of Ronald
Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, and T. N.
Srinivasan and Bhagwati.
The work of Findlay-Wellisz and Srinivas-
an-Bhagwati (F-W-S-B) explicitly deploys
the tools, insights and ideas of general equilib-
rium international trade theory. In particular,
their analyses have been addressed to the
question of deriving the shadow prices for
primary factors for the purpose of project
evaluation in the presence of distortions:
Findlay-Wellisz (F-W) considering produet-
market and trade distortions and Srinivasan-
Bhagwati (S-B) also extending their analysis
to a number of factor-market distortions.
Their analyses has been conducted essen-
tially within the framework of the two-by-two
small-country model of traditional interna-
tional trade theory. An important conse-
quence is what might be called the "station-
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ariness" of the "marginal variational"
shadow prices of factors (derived by mar-
ginal, i.e., infinitesimal, variation) such that,
as S-B phrased it,,
[WJhile we have confined our analysis
to 'small' projects, drawing infinitesimal
resources away from the existing dis-
torted situation, it is equally elear from
our analysis that the results will also hold
for 'large' projects. Given the Rybczyn-
ski-line properties of the different mod-
els, the shadow prices of factors will be
identical for small and large shifts of
factors into the project, [p. 113]
When the Rybczynski-line properties no
longer hold, the marginal variational shadow
prices applicable for single projects with
infinitesimal factor withdrawals will indeed
vary as the factor endowment vector varies.
Similarly, for a project withdrawing finite
amounts of factors' the marginal variational
shadow prices computed before the with-
drawal will then differ from those computed
after the withdrawal. Moreover, shadow
prices computed by marginal variations from
the "residual factor vector" (after the with-
drawal) will depend upon the size and compo-
sition of the factors withdrawn.^
The "stationarity" of the marginal varia-
' Equally, for a successive sequence of "small" projects,
collectively withdrawing finite amounts of factors in the
aggregate,
^As a matter of pure formality, "true" shadow prices
can be defined, a posteriori, for projects withdrawing
finite factor dosages (see the authors. Appendix I). Such
shadow prices, used for project evaluation, will tautolog-
ically yield the opportunity cost. However, these prices
will vary from project to project and their derivation will
require each time the solution of a full programming
problem for project selection. Such shadow price compu-
tation will therefore become a purely academic exercise:
the projects having been selected in the programming
problem already. A similar point has been made by
Bhagwati and Srinivasan in relation to estimating the
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tional shadow prices, in the presence of non-
infinitesimal factor withdrawals, such that
the valuation of these factors in project use at
the marginal variational shadow prices none-
theless equals their true social opportunity
cost, is therefore a critical question.^ This is
precisely the issue, effectively skirted in the
standard analyses of shadow prices in project
evaluation by the convenient assumption of
"small" projects, that we propose to examine
in the present paper. Towards this end, we
propose to relax the two-by-two property of
the F-W-S-B model to allow for many goods
and factors: it is shown that uniqueness and
stationarity of the marginal variational
shadow prices are not always guaranteed once
the number of goods differs from that of
factors.
Section I recapitulates the basic F-W-S-B
analysis, retaining the two-by-two model but
distinguishing between the with-distortion
and the no-distortion cases. Section II exam-
ines the many-goods-and-factors cases:
Case I: Goods equal factors, no distortion.
Case 2: Goods equal factors, with distortion.
Case 3: Goods outnumber factors, no distor-
tion.
Case 4: Goods outnumber factors, with dis-
tortion.
effective rate of protection {ERP) index for resource
allocation prediction in the case of generalized factor
substitution. They argue that, in general, to compute the
"correct" ERP index, we must solve the general equilib-
rium system for the tariff change; but if we have done
that, we already know the total resource allocation
change and we do not need the ERP index to tell us the
direction of such change.
^For an extremely scathing and articulate critique of
cost-benefit analysts by a programmer-planner who
argues that shadow prices which apply to negligible (i,e,,
infinitesimal) projects are of negligible interest, see Asok
Rudra, He is clearly assuming what we christen here the
"nonstationarity" of the marginal variational shadow
factor prices and therefore his critique, while fundamen-
tally sound in principle, goes too far in failing to show
awareness of possible stationarity of shadow prices.
Case 5: Factors outnumber goods, no distor-
tion.
Case 6: Factors outnumber goods, with dis-
tortion.
Section III offers concluding observations,
indicating the applicability of our analysis to
other problems in trade theory (for example,
the transfer problem and the welfare effects
of labor mobility) and the relationship of our
results to mathematical programming. Owing
to lack of space, we do not report here: I) how
the replacement of the ad valorem tariff
distortion by a quantitative quota distortion
would destroy the stationarity of shadow
prices in the F-W-S-B model; nor 2) how the
major propositions in Section II can be proved
with rigor, and generalized to cover the cases
of (i) joint outputs, (ii) traded inputs, (iii)
nontraded, domestically produced inputs un-
fit for consumption, (iv) primary inputs with
variable supply, and (v) consumable non-
traded domestic products. Interested readers
may refer to the authors (Section II; Appen-
dices I, II).
I. Recapitulating and Completing Analysis
within the F-W-S-B Model
The F-W-S-B model is characterized by
three key features: constant-returns-to-scaie
production functions;"* two primary factors
producing two traded goods; and fixed foreign
prices for the two traded goods (the Sam-
uelson "small-country" assumption). The
problem of deriving shadow factor prices for a
project producing a third traded good then is
tantamount to deriving the changes in outputs
of the two traded goods (x, and Xj) that
follow from the withdrawal of factors (v, and
Vj) from existing allocations and then evalu-
ating these output changes at (the fixed)
international prices. According to the Littie-
Mirrlees "rule," the shadow price of a factor
is precisely the value of output foregone when
this factor is marginally, that is, infinitesi-
*F-W and S-B do not explicitly rule out factor-
intensity reversals. On what happens when they are
present, see our analysis, below.





mally, withdrawn at the distorted market
prices, with the valuation itself being carried
out at the international prices.^
Thus, take Figure 1 which depicts the usual
production possibility curve for the two
traded goods, x, and X;. Distinguish now two
cases: I) no distortion; and 2) a (given)
product-market or trade distortion.^ For the
former case, production will take place at P*;
for the latter case, it will occur at P. In the
former case, the withdrawal of factor Vj,
assumed to be intensively used in commodity
X2, will successively reduce the output of Ji:2
and increase it for x, along the Rybczynski
line p*R* whereas a similar withdrawal of
'Given the small-country assumption, this rule leads to
the correct choice of a project because if the social cost of
factors used therein, so derived, is below the international
valuation of the project's output, the acceptance of the
project will increase the international valuation of total
output in the economy. When that happens, as long as the
degree of consumption distortion remains unchanged (as
when a tariff is in place), the analyst can infer that social
welfare (as conventionally defined) will have increased as
well (except in the presence of inferior goods when
multiple equilibria can arise and society may be at an
inferior equilibrium although a superior equilibrium is
always available if the international valuation of total
output has increased). For a full discussion of these
issues, and the relationship between the Little-Mirrlees
rule and the Diamond-Mirrlees technique for deriving
identical shadow prices, see Srinivasan and Bhagwati.
''A product-market distortion essentially implies that
the domestic producers face production tax-cum-subsidy-
inclusive prices or tariff-inclusive prices, rather than the
international prices for the two goods. If we invoke a
tariff, there will be a consumption distortion as well. But
this creates no difficulties for our analysis, so that our
analysis holds equally for trade distortions.
factor Vj will define, in the latter case, a
similar (nonparallel) Rybczynski line PR.^ In
each case, the commodity price ratio is clearly
held constant as the factor is withdrawn for
use in the project producing commodity x^; in
the no-distortion case this is the international
price ratio whereas, in the distortion case, it is
the distorted commodity price ratio. The eval-
uation of the changes in outputs along the
relevant Rybczynski line, however, is at the
international prices in both cases.^
An important consequence is that, as long
as the withdrawal of factors, no matter how
large, permits the small economy to remain
on the Rybczynski line in Figure 1, whether
there is a given distortion or none, the shadow
factor prices will be "stationary."' What
happens if factors are withdrawn such that
the economy moves off the Rybczynski line?
First, focusing on the no-distortion case,
assume that the withdrawal of primary factor
2̂ leads the economy finally to complete
specialization on commodity x, at the bottom
of P*R* at R*. If then another unit of Vj is
withdrawn, it is evident that the economy will
move towards the origin along the horizontal
axis and that, as it does so, the real rental of
factor Vj will rise in terms of both of the
traded goods, x, and Xj. Essentially, one has
slipped out of the "linearity" property of the
system and diminishing returns to varying
proportions are now taking over. The net
result therefore is that, for any withdrawals of
the primary factor V; beyond those that lead
from P* to R*, the shadow prices of the
'The slope of the Rybczynski lines reflects the average
productivity of the primary factors whereas the slope of
the commodity price ratio at which the Rybczynski line is
defined reflects, of course, the marginal productivity of
the factors. On this, as also on the relationship between
the Rybczynski lines at different points on the pro-
duction-possibility curve (as at P* and P), see Trent
Bertrand and Frank Flatters, and Richard Brecher in
particular,
"For simplicity. Figure I has been drawn such that the
possibility of a negative shadow factor price is ruled out.
On this paradoxical possibility, see Srinivasan and Bhag-
wati, and Bhagwati, Srinivasan, and Wan,
'S-B do not consider what happens beyond the Ryb-
czynski line. Rather they consider other questions such as
the relationship of their results on shadow factor prices to
the use of domestic resource costs and effective rate of
protection as project evaluation criteria.
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factors are no longer stationary and can be
shown to increase (for the factor withdrawn)
for successive withdrawals of the factor for
utilization in the project in question. This also
implies that, for these ranges of increasing
cost withdrawal of factor Vj, the use of the
shadow prices for marginal variation at F*
would yield an understatement of the true
shadow cost of the factor. Alternatively, one
may phrase this to say that the use of mar-
ginal variational shadow prices, when station-
ariness does not obtain, Ignores the "secon-
dary cost" that must be added to the "pri-
mary cost" as measured at the marginal
variational shadow prices.
All this can be seen perfectly generally, for
withdrawals of both factors, in terms of the
McKenzie-Chipman diversification cone in
Figure 2. Assuming that 171 and 2̂ define the
V, /vj ratios chosen at the prevailing commod-
ity price ratio (i.e., at F* in Figure 1) and the
associated factor-price ratio which is the slope
of the line ^1^2^ "ot^ t^^t the overall factor
endowment ratio must be a weighted sum of
the two sectoral factor proportions.'*' It is
evident then that q^Oqi defines a diversifica-
tion cone: as long as the factor-endowment
vector lies strictly within the cone, both goods
will be produced at the postulated commodity
and associated factor-price ratios. Hence the
aggregate endowment vector (v,, Vj) is shown
to lie within the cone qyOqj, indicating pro-
duction of both goods at levels xf and xf
(corresponding to F* in Figure 1). Note that
the aggregate endowment vector (vi,V2) is
shown by the parallelogram in Figure 2 to be
a weighted vector sum of the factor propor-
tions in the two goods, the actual outputs
being read off from the isoquants x* and
X2 .
It follows immediately that (given the
commodity price ratio) as long as the residual
factor vector, left over after successive with-
drawals of the factors for project use, contin-
ues to lie within the cone q^Oq^, the equilib-
rium factor-price ratio need not change from
'"Thus, denoting the overall endowments as v, and V;,
we must have (assuming full employment) v, /v, as the V;
share-weigh ted sum of the V|/v2 ratios in the production




all changes in factor endowments
will be accommodated merely by changes in
the composition of outputs. Hence, the
McKenzie-Chipman diversification cone in
the present case is identical to what we shall
refer to as the Rybczynski cone: the latter
being the set of residual factor vectors for
which marginal variational shadow factor
prices will remain stationary at the slope of
the price line q\qi. This stationarity of these
shadow factor prices will disappear, however,
as soon as the residual factor vector slips out
of this cone." Note also the following:
(i) As must be evident, the slope of the line
?i?2 represents the ratio of the marginal
variational shadow factor prices, these being
the prices corresponding to infinitesimal
factor withdrawal.
(ii) The secondary cost of withdrawn
factors that leave the residual factor vector
outside the Rybczynski cone may be defined
as the excess of their true shadow cost over
their cost if measured at the marginal varia-
tional prices. The proportionate secondary
cost, defined as the ratio of the secondary cost
to the cost at the marginal variational prices,
will be an increasing function of the extent to
"Reverting to Figure 1, note then that all withdrawals
of factor If, resulting in moves along F*R* leave the
residual factor vector in the diversification cone whereas
further withdrawals of v,, leading to moves along R*0,
imply that the residual factor vector has slipped out of the
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which the residual factor vector slips out of
the Rybczynski cone.'^
(iii) Finally, note that the unique Ryb-
czynski cone in Figure 2 implicitly rules out
factor-intensity reversals. If we had allowed
for such reversals, however, we would have
had more than one diversification cone. In
this case, even if production were no longer
specialized, secondary cost would emerge.
Moreover, as before, the more the residual
factor vector slips out of the Rybczynski cone,
the higher will be the share of secondary cost
in the entire project cost.
Second, for the with-distortion case, the
preceding analysis for the no-distortion case
holds qualitatively with one exception: the
secondary cost can be a secondary gain.
Returning to Figure 2, note that in the
distortion-free case, for residual factor vectors
that take the economy outside the Rybczynski
cone q20q\y the true social cost of factors in
project use will be understated because valu-
ing, say, a residual endowment at H at the
marginal variational prices overstates its true
value and hence understates the difference
between the preproject and the postproject
valuation of the quantities of commodities x,
and X2 that are being produced: this being the
secondary cost noted above. But suppose now
there is an export tax on Xj so that its price is
lower on the domestic market than on the
world market. Guided by the domestic prices,
firms collectively will produce more x, and
less Xj than what it takes to maximize the
national output at international prices. Now
assume a withdrawal of inputs which causes
the residual factor vector to leave the diversi-
fication-cum-Rybczynski cone, so that good
Xj alone is produced. This change of the
output mix improves on the original distor-
tion-caused misallocation and hence increases
the internationally valued national output.
Conceivably, this effect may outweigh the
secondary cost from the law of variable
proportions and result in a net secondary
gain.'^
'^Thus, for residual factor endowments lying on the ray
OG in Figure 2, the proportionate secondary cost will be
higher than for those lying on the ray OH.
II. Many Goods and Factors, with and
without Distortions
The uniqueness and stationarity of the
marginal variational shadow factor prices in
the two-by-two F-W-S-B model, with and
without the specified distortions, do not neces-
sarily carry over to the cases with unequal
numbers of goods and factors that need to be
analyzed as soon as we consider many goods
and factors. The analysis of these cases is
simply developed in this section, at a qualita-
tively insightful level.'*
The precise questions that are addressed
for the six possible cases discussed here are
noted best by recalling that the shadow price
of factors withdrawn for project use is the
sum of the resulting changes in outputs
valued at international prices. Write this
shadow cost as
c,, =
where ĉ  denotes the shadow factor cost of a
project (program) k, p* is the vector of
international prices, and AjX is the vector of
changes in nonproject production in the coun-
try as a result of the withdrawal of factors for
project use, (Here x, p, and p* represent
m-dimensional vectors denoting output quan-
tities, (domestic) output prices facing the
firms, and international prices, respectively.
Also V, w, and w* will be /i-dimensional
vectors representing factor quantities and
factor prices related to domestic and interna-
tional prices, respectively.) Noting that
for preproject marginal variationa! shadow
factor prices w* and infinitesimal factor with-
drawal for project use, we can then pose three
questions of principal importance in this
'^The secondary gain in fact may turn the social cost of
the factors withdrawn for project use into a net gain,
resurrecting the paradox of negative shadow prices of
factors noted in Bhagwati, Srinivasan, and Wan,
"The algebraic analysis, necessary for general formu-
lations, is in Appendix I of our working paper; available
from the authors on request.
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section:
(i) Can the social opportunity cost c^ be
uniquely defined?
(ii) Will the shadow factor prices be
stationary for finite factor withdrawals in the
perfectly general sense that —w*AtV will
equal (Ci = ) — p*^kX, i.e., the valuation of
the withdrawn factors at the preproject
marginal variational shadow prices will equal
the social opportunity cost of the foregone
output?
(iii) Will the use of marginal variational
shadow factor prices, when inappropriate,
necessarily understate the social cost of the
project?'^
The results of our analysis are summarized
in advance for the reader's convenience in
Table I.
A. Cases I and 2: Equal Numbers of Goods
and Factors, with and without Distortions
The introduction of more than two goods
and factors, as long as goods are equal in
number to factors, changes the results of the
two-by-two F-W-S-B model in no essential
manner. As before, a diversification cone can
be defined and, since it is also the Rybczynski
cone, the marginal variational shadow factor
"in answering these questions, we will generally ignore
the "extreme" cases which provide exceptions to our
propositions and analysis, so that we can avoid frequent
repetition of eaveats regarding them. Such extreme cases
are reviewed readily for the two-by-two model. Thus (a)
certain projects will cause difficulties. For instance,
consider a project using up resources of magnitude and
proportions such that the residual vector is no longer in
the same diversification eone as the initial vector. Either
complete specialization will occur, or the residual vector
may now be in another diversification cone (as may
happen when factor intensity is reversible), and shadow
prices will change, (b) Certain projects almost surely will
cause no difficulty. Thus, consider the case where the
diverted resources, and hence the residual resources, are
proportional to the initial resources, (c) Certain circum-
stances almost surely will cause diRiculties. For instance,
take the case where the two unit-output isoquants, one for
each project, are tangential to a common tangent at the
same point, (d) Certain circumstances almost surely will
cause no difficulties. For instance, consider the case
where, over some relevant range, the two inputs are
"perfect substitutes" in the sense that a linear segment of
the unit-output isoquant of at least one product
prevails.
TABLE !—SIX ALTERNATIVE CASES: OUTCOMES





























'"Extreme" cases noted in fn. 15 are excluded. For the
no-distortion cases, the use of marginal variational
shadow factor prices will necessarily underestimate the
true social cost of a project; not so for the with-distortion
cases.
prices are unique and also stationary as long
as the residual factor endowment leaves the
economy within this cone.
When the residual factor endowment takes
the economy into the nonstationarity zone,
the use of marginal variational shadow factor
prices will necessarily understate the true
social cost of the factors used in the project if
distortions are absent; but it may overstate
the true cost (i.e., the secondary cost may turn
into a secondary gain) when distortions are
present.
B. Case 3: Goods Outnumber Factors,
No Distortions
It is equally evident that, where goods
outnumber factors and there is no distortion,
there will be no problem with uniqueness and
stationarity in general. A diversification-cum-
Rybczynski cone can again be defined and,
within it, the marginal variational shadow
factor prices will be unique and stationary.
The product mix will be indeterminate of
course, but this does not affect the shadow
factor prices, as should be evident by redraw-
ing the Lerner-Findlay-Grubert diagram
(Figure 2) for more than two goods by merely
putting in more isoquants tangent to the
linear segment g?^,.
The use of marginal variational shadow
factor prices for evaluating the social cost of
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the factors used in the project, when the
residual factor endowment leaves the econ-
omy outside this cone, will necessarily under-
state their true social cost: that is, secondary
cost will necessarily arise.
C. Case 4: Goods Outnumber Factors,
with Distortions
While, however, there is no problem as long
as goods outnumber factors in the absence of
distortions, the introduction of distortions
leads to difficulties. Intuitively, it is easy to
see why. For the diversification cone is
defined with respect to /J, the domestic output
prices. Hence, within the cone, the indetermi-
nacy of the output mix is still compatible with
unique opportunity cost and hence with
unique and stationary factor valuations as
long as the marginal variational changes in
outputs from factor withdrawals are evalu-
ated at the domestic prices. However, the
shadow factor prices require these output
changes to be evaluated at the international
goods prices p*. When p = p* (i.e.. Case 3),
shadow factor prices will also be unique and
stationary within the diversification cone.
But when p f p*, the social opportunity
cost of the withdrawn factors, even when the
residual vector remains in the diversification
cone, may not be unique but will reflect the
particular product mix happening to obtain
out of the indeterminate many. Hence the
associated shadow factor prices may be unde-
fined.
Suppose, however, that a "planner"
chooses for each residual vector that particu-
lar output mix whose value, evaluated at
international prices/?*, is maximal. Could we
then argue that in this event the shadow
factor prices will be stationary within the
diversification cone? The answer unfortu-
nately is again in the negative, generally
speaking. Note that even if it were in the
affirmative, to use such shadow prices for
project evaluation, we would have to assume
that these maximal-value product mixes were
in fact the equilibrium output mixes obtaining
in the economy before and after the factor
withdrawals for the projects in question.
Otherwise, the "true" opportunity costs of the
withdrawn factors would not correspond to
the "shadow" opportunity costs as calculated
with the maximal-value procedure.
All this should be perfectly intuitive, once
the difference between p and p* under the
specified distortion is grasped. It can be
established more formally'* but may rather be
illustrated to great advantage with the aid of
the "micro-theoretic" diagrams. Figures
3A-E. Figures 3A-C introduce the basic
technique, while Figures 3D-E illustrate our
basic propositions with this technique by
using a three-good, two-factor, with-distor-
tion depiction.
In Figure 3A, two inputs v, and Vj are used
to produce output x, which is depicted along
the vertical axis Ox. At the initial endowment
V, height vv of the production surface OCD
shows the output value before factor with-
drawal for project use. A project using both
factors in proportion to the initial endow-
ments will leave a residual vector OB within
the ray Ov. The difference in height between
BB and vv reflects then the project cost. The
unique tangent plane OFP' to surface OCD at
V represents clearly the marginal variational
valuation of any residual factor vector.'^
Since B lies both on OCvD and on its tangent
plane OFF'., such valuation incurs no secon-
dary cost for the project in question. By
contrast, a project using factors not propor-
tional to the initial endowments will leave a
residual vector OA off the Ov ray (which is of
course the Rybczynski cone in the present
case). The maximum output producible at A
is the height of the OCD surface AA, which is
lesj than the marginal variational valuation
AA for OA. The overvaluation of the residual
vector thus causes an understatement of the
true opportunity cost of (the factors used in)
the project.
Figure 3B extends this construction to
incorporate two goods Xy and Xi. If we select
units such that the output prices are unity for
both goods, the surface OC^, and 0Dq2 reflect
what is producible if all inputs are used to
Mathematical proofs are contained in the unpub-
lished Appendix I in our working paper.
'^The directional cosines at v reflect the marginal
products of the two inputs. Their ratio is the slope of line
CD in plane v^Ov^, while PP'UCD.
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produce only X| andxj, respectively, and their
convex hull therefore has surface OCD and
tangent plane OFF' reflecting the marginal
variational valuation of all residual factor
vectors. The factor proportions producing
good jc, (xj) under the prevailing factor prices
before the project are reflected by ray
Oq] {Oqj). If a project leaves a residual factor
vector OA within the Rybczynski cone q\0q2,
then the marginal variational valuation AA.,
thereof, agrees with the true maximum
output value producible therewith: there is
therefore no overvaluation for OA and thus no
understatement of the project cost.
Figure 3C modifies Figure 3B to allow
international prices to difl'er from domestic
prices, illustrating the distortion, Thus, it
portrays an export tax on commodity :c,.
Consequently, the world market value of any
output mix is higher than the domestic
market value if and only if some x, is
produced. The OCqiq^D surface is con-
structed to reflect this fact. The 0^|^2 planar
segment reflects therefore the true social
value of any residual factor vector falling
within the diversification cone q^ Oqi •
We can now proceed to our full illustration
of the three-good, two-factor, with-distortion
case. Thus Figures 3D-E additionally portray
output of Xj which is also assumed (like x,) to
be exported under an export tax. It is further
assumed that the factor intensity of good Xj
lies between that of the other two goods.
Clearly the construction of the
surface is similar to that of the
surface in Figure 3C.
Figure 3D then shows the case where, by
coincidence, ^1 .̂1^2 f̂ ll on one line such that
Oqiq^qi constitutes a single planar segment
whose height at any residual factor vector
within the diversification cone 0^,^2 t̂ î n
reflects the true social (i.e., international)
value of that vector. Hence also the difference
between that height and the height vv (corre-
sponding to the preproject endowment vector)
represents the true opportunity cost of the
factors withdrawn for project use. Clearly,
because of the planar segment, this opportu-
nity cost is unique even within the diversifica-
tion cone.
By contrast, the general case is depicted in
Figure 3E. Here the planar segment disap-
pears and instead one gets indeterminate,
social opportunity cost for the project within
the diversification cone.'^ Depending on the
output mix, we can see that the (social) value
producible by a residual factor vector can
vary from the "optimistic surface" Oq^q-^qj to
the "pessimistic surface" Oq^^2', ^nd the
project evaluator cannot predict what will
happen and therefore which opportunity cost
will prevail.'''
Finally, note that the indeterminacy of the
marginal variational shadow prices in tbis
case renders somewhat academic the question
whether their use outside the diversification
cone would understate or overstate the true
opportunity cost of factors withdrawn for
project use.
D. Case 5: Factors Outnumber Goods,
No Distortion
We now turn to the case where factors
outnumber goods and there is no distortion.
As one would expect from the well-known
work of Paul Samuelson (1953) and other
writers in the theory of international trade,
even this distortion-free world will present
problems, because in general primary factor
prices will vary with the factor endowments so
that the withdrawal of factors for project use
will generally imply varying factor prices and
hence the absence of a set of stationary
shadow factor prices, except for a negligible
set of residual factor vectors. More precisely,
we will argue the following propositions
concerning the implications of the case where
factors outnumber '̂'
PROPOSITION I: Marginal variational
shadow factor prices will be stationary if and
only if the residual factor proportions belong
to that negligible set of all possible propor-
'*The eone q^Oqi is no longer a Rybczynski cone since
shadow factor prices are not stationary within it any more
because of the distortion.
"On the other hand, note that the uniqueness of
opportunity cost will return once we leave the diversifica-
tion cone.
"*The formal proofs are to be found in the unpublished
Appendix I in our working paper.
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where the residual factors can be
absorbed into industries at preproject factor
intensities.
PROPOSITION 2: If the condition in Frop-
osition I is violated, the Law of Variable
Froportions will cause the opportunity cost
for the project to differ from the marginal
variational value of the factors withdrawn
for use in the project, and to exceed the latter
by a secondary cost.
PROPOSITION 3: This secondary cost will
bear a proportional relation to the marginal
variational value of the residual factors: a
proportion rising steadily from zero at a
nondecreasing rate as the residual factor
proportions deviate progressively from the
"negligible set" cited in Froposition I.
PROPOSITION 4: There is a continuum of
diversification subcones, each of them poly-
hedral inform and corresponding to a unique
domestic factor-price vector. If that domestic
factor-price vector deviates from the prepro-
ject factor-price vector, then all residual
factor vectors in that subcone will be over-
valued under (preproject) marginal varia-
tional valuation by the same proportion.
Each diversification subcone is a Rybczynski
cone (defined on some domestic factor-price
vector) and the totality of all such diversifi-
cation cones, not necessarily convex, forms
the McKenzie-Chipman diversification cone.
Propositions 1-3 can be visualized immedi-
ately by reference to a two-factor, one-good
model. In Figure 4A, if the residual factor
vector lies (as at /I) on the ray OR from the
origin, which is the ray on which the prepro-
ject factor endowment ratio lies, clearly there
will be no project-induced change in the
factor prices. For projects that leave the
residual factor-endowment ratios elsewhere
(as at B and C, for example, on the rays OB
and OC), on the other hand, there will be














the secondary cost that results may be illus-
trated in the now familiar construction (see
Figure 3A) in Figure 4B. Note in particular
that the values of the outputs for the
isoquants passing through A., B, Cand indeed
all points along the ABC line in Figure 4A can
be plotted as the concave curve in Figure 4B
and this at once illustrates Proposition 3
above." At the same time, note that the
residual factor proportions must lie on the ray
OR if stationarity of shadow factor prices is to
be maintained, thus clearly demonstrating the
"negligible" character of such stationarity-
set is the lower-dimension cone of the nonnega-
tively weighted sums of the preproject factor proportions
for various industries.
"Recall that the curve xiA) x(B) x(C) in Figure 4B is
actually the vertical cross section of the production
surface along the tine ABC in Figure 4A.
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preserving projects in our two-dimensional
world, as argued in Propositions 1 and 2
above.
Turn now to the three-factor, two-good
world where Proposition 4 is also admissible
and hence demonstrable. (Since the formal
proof is in Appendix I of our working paper, a
few words of intuitive explanation should
suffice here.) Corresponding to the initial
preproject factor endowments, assume that
the factor prices are determined such that all
goods are produced (i.e., "diversification"
obtains). Now, if for a finite project the
postproject residual factor-endowment vector
can be accommodated by suitable reweight-
ing of the initial faetor-proportions vectors,
this is fine and stationarity obtains: though, as
staled in Proposition 1, this set of possibilities
is negligible. Suppose now that the residual
factor-endowment vector requires new factor
prices and hence new factor-proportion
vectors in the production of the different
goods. We can then immediately see both that
there is now secondary cost and that, assum-
ing continuing diversification, generally
speaking there will be again a negligible set of
factor-withdrawal possibilities at which the
new factor prices and proportions, and hence
the proportionate secondary cost vis-a-vis the
old (marginal variational) factor prices, wilt
remain unchanged. Therefore, clearly Propo-
sition 4 is intuitively established.
E. Case 6: Factors Outnumber Goods,
with Distortion
Here, as in Case 5, except for a negligible
set of residual factor vectors, the marginal
variational shadow factor prices may be
nonstationary. The presence of the distortion,
however, makes it impossible to assert that
the use of marginal variational shadow factor
prices outside of the diversification subcone to
which they pertain will necessarily overstate
or understate the true opportunity cost of the
factors withdrawn for project use.
III. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis leads to many observations,
First, as a quiek perusal of the summary of
Table I will show, the relative numbering of
factors and goods is of significance. Project
evaluation by shadow price computation is
possible in the happy world of equal numbers
of goods and factors, but lies between the
Scylla of indeterminacy where goods exceed
factors and the Charybdis of nonstationarity
where factors exceed goods. The presence of
distortions, in turn, is seen to be of signifi-
cance in two ways: (i) unlike the distortion-
free case, it creates nonuniqueness of shadow
factor prices when goods outnumber factors;
and (ii) while the distortion-free cases are
characterized by secondary cost when mar-
ginal variational shadow factor prices are
used outside of the zone of stationarity, the
distortionary cases can be characterized
instead by secondary gain as well.
Second, our analysis has clear applicability
to the transfer problem, conceived not as a
transfer of purchasing power, but rather as a
transfer of factors of production as may be the
case when reparations payments have to be
made in barter (for example, Soviet Union
transferring factories from Germany after
World War II). By contrast with the purchas-
ing power shift variety of transfers analyzed
in the standard trade-theoretic literature (for
example by Samuelson, 1952, 1954; Harry
Johnson, 1956; and others), we must now
contend with the possible existence of secon-
dary costs (or gains, when distortions are
present) even when the small-country as-
sumption is made.
Third, our analysis also has applicability
therefore to the theory of international factor
mobility. Thus, the existing theoretical
analyses, by Herbert Grubel and A. Scott,
Albert Berry and Ronald Soligo, Johnson
(1968), and Peter Kenen, of the welfare
effects of brain drain on "those left behind,"
as reviewed and synthesized in Bhagwati and
Carlos Rodriguez, relate to two-factor models
with one or two products, with focus mainly
on one-factor emigration. Our present analy-
sis leads, however, to the following generali-
zation: For a small country without distor-
tions, and with each individual possessing the
same factor endowment, any finite level of
emigration of factors, singly or in combina-
tion, will harm (or have no effect on) those
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left behind, if the residual factor vector falls
outside (or is left inside) the preemigration
Rybczynski cone. The harmful effect will
almost always obtain when factors outnumber
goods.
Fourth, for a small country without distor-
tion, the welfare impact of finite factor
increases (for example labor immigration,
capital inflow) on those originally present is
completely symmetrical. If every individual
has an identical endowment, there is no effect
or there is a beneficial effect (in the absence
of distortions), depending upon whether the
"augmented factor vector" is inside or outside
the Rybczynski cone, and the latter possibility
will almost always arise with factors outnum-
bering goods.
Fifth, the locus classicus of shadow prices
is mathematical programming. It appears
desirable to relate our findings with the
programming framework, cross-referencing
the economic assumptions, the programming
formulation, and the implications for the
shadow cost of a project. All these are tabu-
lated in Table 2. Recall that, inside the
Rybczynski cone, the Law of Variable












































Proportions is held at bay for the small-
country, constant returns situation; hence
stationarity of marginal variational shadow
factor cost obtains.
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